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Optimal Capital Structure in Centralized Agricultural Cooperatives
This research used a stochastic interest rate to determine the optimal solvency (equity to
asset) for 14 Kansas centralized agricultural cooperatives.  Solvency was sensitive to
including a stochastic interest rate.  Additionally, solvency was sensitive to the change in
business and financial risk.
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Introduction
One of the most important and most difficult decisions a cooperative must make is the
choice of capital structure.  The theory of optimal leverage suggests the cost of debt is less
than the cost of equity capital due to differences in risk and the tax deductibility of debt. 
Thus, the use of leverage can increase the rate of return to equity.  However, debt increases
financial risk, making insolvency a more likely possibility.  Thus, the management of a
cooperative must weigh the trade-offs between debt and equity.  Through proper capital
structure, management can influence the financial performance of the business (Forster).
An agricultural cooperative requires capital to purchase land, buildings, and
equipment, and provide a means for acquiring working capital.  Cooperatives acquire
capital from equity or debt.  Cooperatives acquire equity capital by selling equity interest
and by retaining equity from revenues and net income generated through operations.
1 
Individual members are generally expected to provide equity in proportion to their use of
the cooperative (Cobia).  Typically, the equity is held at par value (i.e., does not appreciate
or depreciate) and pays no dividends.  Some cooperative managers incorrectly perceive the
cost of acquiring equity to be zero in this situation.  Thus, cooperative management may
follow the practice of maximizing the use of equity capital and minimizing the use of debt. 
The size of the equity pool may also depend on the equity management strategy.
2  Decisions
                                                       
1  Retained equity may be per unit capital retained, retained patronage refunds, or
retained earnings.
2Equity redemption methods used by cooperatives are age of patron, special
redemptions (such as estate settlement), revolving fund, and percentage of base capital.2
by the cooperative and members on equity investment should be made based on the
members cost of equity capital.  The cost of providing equity to a cooperative by the
member is the opportunity cost of investing money  in a member's own operation or other
alternatives.
Cooperatives also acquire capital through debt financing.  Acquiring an optimal level
of debt is attractive to cooperative directors, because it allows for members to achieve a
higher return on patronage when the cost of debt is less than the cost of equity.   However,
acquiring too much debt may subject cooperatives to financial risk due to varying interest
rates and variability in net income may compound risk (Cobia).
The cooperative needs to operate at an optimal solvency level.  Equity financing
should be decreased as the cost of equity approaches the cost of debt.  Cooperatives need
to be able to determine an optimal level of debt and equity to operate efficiently and guard
against unexpected shocks.  This study examines the optimal solvency ratios for 14
cooperatives and derives how the solvency ratio id effected from changes in risk.
This analysis uses the theoretical model developed by Collins and incorporates a
stochastic interest rate to better model exogenous risk.
3  Incorporating a stochastic interest
rate into the Collins model has two effects on determining an optimal solvency ratio.  First,
the interest rate is allowed to vary over time (increased risk).  Secondly, interaction between
the interest rate and the rate of return on assets is incorporated into the model because of
                                                       
3Moss et. al. incorporated taxes into the model derived by Collins and evaluated
the effects of changes in taxes.3
the interdependence of the two variables.  If differences in optimal capital structure exist
from the use of a stochastic interest rate, cooperative management must be made aware of
this.
Empirical Model
An agricultural cooperative is sometimes perceived as an extension of the farm (Sexton).
4 
Centralized agricultural cooperatives are owned by members (agricultural producers) and
the board of directors is almost always made up of a set of these members.  Federated and
mixed cooperatives are indirectly, if not directly, owned and controlled by producer-
members.  Thus, we extend a theoretical model of farmer behavior to the cooperative. 
Collins derived an empirical model to estimate the optimal equity/asset ratio.
The Collins model can be used to indicate how decreasing the variability of returns
on equity (e.g., management, including investment and equity redemption strategies)
decreases a cooperative's solvency position.  Following Collins, it is possible to derive a
mean stochastic rate of return on equity (RE _  ) as:
(1) RE _  =(RA _   - K _ d) ￿ 1/(1 - d),
where K _  represents the mean stochastic interest rate, RA _   is the mean rate of return on
assets, and d is the ratio of debt to assets.  Under the assumption of a stochastic interest
rate, the variance of the rate of return on equity (s
2
E ) is:
                                                       
4For this analysis, agricultural cooperatives are assumed to not have a readily
available equity market.  This assumption makes the decision process parallel between
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2 ￿ gA,K,
where gA,K represents the covariance between rate of return on assets and the interest rate,
s
2
K is the variance of the interest rate, and s
2
A is the variance of the rate of return on assets. 
Note, by allowing the variance of the interest rate to be zero in equation 2, the computation
of the optimal solvency ratio is identical to that derived by Collins.
It is assumed that farmers maximize expected utility and that their preferences can
be represented by a negative exponential utility function (Freund, Selley).  Under the
conditions of normality, RA _  ~N(RA _  , s
2
A) and K _ ~N(K _  , s
2
K), and a constant risk-aversion
coefficient, the expected utility-maximizing solution is obtained by maximizing:
(3) L(d) = (RE _  -K _ d) ￿ (1/(1 - d))
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- (2d/(1 - d)
2) ￿ gA,K),
where r refers to the Pratt-Arrow decreasing relative risk aversion coefficient.  First order
conditions for maximization indicate the derivative of expected utility of the rate of return
on equity as a function of leverage is:
(4) ¶L(d)/¶d = K _ /(1 - d) + (RA _   - K _ d) ￿ (1/(1 - d)
2)  -  r ￿ s
2
A ￿ (1/(1 - d)
3)
- r ￿ s
2
K ￿ (d/(1 - d)
3) +r ￿ gA,K ￿ ((1+d)/(1 - d)
3) =0.
Solving equation 4 for d, the optimal leverage ratio (d
*) is:
(5) d
* = (RA _  - K _ - r￿s
2
A +r￿gA,K)/(RA _  - K _ +r￿s
2
K - r￿gA,K).
Equation 5 provides an optimal leverage ratio for alternative levels of a cooperative's risk
aversion, rate of return on assets, cost of debt, variance of the return on assets, variance on
the cost of debt, and the correlation between the rate of return on assets and cost of debt.5
For the leverage or solvency condition to be met, the mean of the rate of return on assets
must be greater than the mean of the interest rate for equation 5.  If the mean return on
assets is not greater than the mean interest rate, the agricultural cooperative is eroding it’s
equity position with the use of debt.  In addition, the optimal solvency ratio (equity-asset
ratio) may be written as one minus the leverage ratio (1-d
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Because the optimal solvency ratio (s
*) is defined as one minus the leverage ratio (1-
d
*), differentiating s
* allows for inferences to be made about business risk.  To
unequivocally sign the following results, it is assumed that the covariance between the
interest rate and the rate of return on assets is negative or zero.  To analyze the effects of s
2
A on s






A =   r/(RA _  - K _ +r￿s
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K - r￿gA,K).
Thus, the change in the solvency ratio from a change in the variance of return on assets has
a positive relationship (¶s
*/¶s
2
A>0).  That is, an increase in business risk (s
2
A) would lead a





                                                       
5 The optimal solvency ratio formula derived by Collins for a non-stochastic
interest rate is of the form s
* = (1 - d
*) = r￿s
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K>0).  That is, as interest rates become more variable the
amount of equity financing should increase.
Differentiating equation 6 with respect to K _  and  RA _  , shows the effect of changes in
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Equations 9 and 10 indicate that the relationship between the solvency ratio and mean
interest rate and mean rate of return on assets is determined by the sign of the numerator. 
An increase in the rate of return on assets has a negative impact on the solvency ratio
(¶s
*/RA _  <0) and an increase in interest rates has a positive impact on the solvency ratio
(¶s
*/¶K _ >0).  As the rate of return on assets increases, more debt financing should be used,
and equity financing should be decreased.  Alternatively, as interest rates increase the
amount of debt financing should decrease and more equity financing used.
The empirical model derived above allows for the calculation of an optimal solvency
ratio for a cooperative.  Additionally, the effects of changes in business risk can be
evaluated (i.e., changes in the variance of the rate of return of assets and the variance of the
interest rate).  The next section describes the data used to estimate the solvency ratios for
this study.7
Data
Data for this analysis were collected, on an annual basis, for Kansas local
cooperatives from 1984 to 1992.  This data were available from the Cooperative Finance
Association (CFA), a business affiliated with and owned by Farmland Industries and the
members of Farmland Industries.  Cooperatives represented in this study are supply and
grain marketing cooperatives.  Grain marketing typically represents about 65% of sales. 
Local cooperatives are common to Kansas and those evaluated in this study have yielded a
relatively high rate of return on assets.  Only those cooperatives having data available over
the entire period of study and having a mean rate of return on assets greater than the
interest rate were evaluated.  This produced 14 cooperatives for the 1984 to 1992 time
period.
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics on an annual basis for the cooperatives
evaluated in this analysis and by cooperative over the period of study, respectively. 
Included in these tables are the number of cooperatives evaluated, mean rate of return on
local assets (ROLA), the standard deviation of the return on local assets, average solvency
ratio, and the Bank for Cooperatives (CoBank) interest rate.  The rate of return on local
assets was calculated as local net savings plus interest paid divided by total assets minus
total investment.  For table 2, the average interest rate realized by each cooperative, over
the period of this study, was 9.4%.
Column three of table 1 indicates that the rate of return on assets varied
considerably over the period of study.  The rate of return on assets ranged from 8.0% to8
15.7%.  The solvency ratio increased over time.  This trend may have been due to the
relatively high financial stress realized by agricultural cooperatives during the early to mid
1980s.  To guard against future shocks, cooperatives reduced leverage and relied more on
equity.  The correlation between the rate of return on assets and the interest rate was low,
at 12.4%.
From table 2, it can be observed that the solvency ratio varies substantially among
cooperatives.  This is an indication of the varying management practices of cooperatives and
the type of cooperative.  The mean rate of return on local assets was relatively stable across
cooperatives, but substantial variability was observed in the standard deviation of the rate of
return on local assets across time.  This represents varying degrees of business risk
(variance of the rate of return on local assets) among cooperatives.  The next section
describes the results obtained from using the described data for determining optimal capital
structure.
Results
Using equation 6, optimal solvency ratios were estimated for cooperatives using the
rate of return on local assets and both a stochastic interest rate (table 3) and non-stochastic
interest rate (table 4).  The rate of return on local assets, as compared to the rate of return
on total assets, was assumed to provide a better measure of the management practices of
the individual cooperative since it excluded regional cooperative investment and patronage
refund income.  Alternative levels of risk aversion were required to estimate solvency ratios
for various risk attitudes.9
Risk aversion coefficients are a measure of the tradeoff between expected profit and
risk.  Relative risk aversion coefficients chosen for this analysis ranged from 5 to 25. 
Numerous studies have indicated the risk averse producer would be in the range of 20 to 30
and the almost risk neutral producer would be in the range of 0 to 2 (Cochran et al., King
and Robison, and Tauer).  If the agricultural cooperative is viewed as an extension of the 
producer’s business, estimated risk aversion coefficients for producers are an adequate
measure of risk aversion for the agricultural cooperative.
Tables 3 and 4 provide empirically estimated solvency ratios (column 3) using a
stochastic and non-stochastic interest rate.  The mean interest rate (9.4%) was used for
computation of values for the non-stochastic interest rate (table 4).  As the level of risk
aversion increased, the solvency ratio increased.  This indicates that a cooperative that is
more risk averse prefers to accept a low return on equity to guard against financial risk. 
Column 2 of tables 3 and 4 show that the rate of return on equity decreases as solvency
increases.  Cooperatives could increase profitability by decreasing equity use.
Columns four through seven of tables 3 and 4 provide sensitivity analysis of the
effects of a 10% change in the interest rate, the rate of return on local assets, variance of the
interest rate, and variance of the rate of return on local assets, respectively.
6  The sensitivity
of solvency to business risk can be seen in tables 3 and 4.  Increasing the variability in
business risk by 10% can cause an increase in the solvency ratio by 6% to 8% at some risk
aversion levels.
                                                       
6Column seven of Table 4 is not applicable if interest rates are non-stochastic.10
The macroeconomic climate effects interest rates and interest rate variability and
hence the optimal level of solvency.  Tables 3 and 4 show significant differences in
estimated values.  For the relative risk aversion level of 15, the solvency ratio using a
stochastic interest rate, was 65.7%.  The solvency ratio using a non-stochastic interest rate
was 63.8%.  The stochastic nature of interest rates increases the optimal solvency ratio at
lower levels of risk aversion and decreases at higher levels.  In addition, an increase in the
interest rate from 9.4% to 10.3% increases the leverage ratio by roughly 50% at low levels
of risk aversion.  Similar differences are observed for a 10% change in the interest rate, rate
of return on local assets, and variance of the rate of return on local assets.  Moller, et. al.
found that high interest rates accounted for 24% of the financial stress in agricultural
cooperatives.  They also found that larger cooperatives are more subject to interest rate
problems.  Clearly, the level and the variability of interest rates are important factors in
determining optimal solvency.
Conclusions
The financial structure of an agricultural cooperative requires the balancing of debt
and equity to assure member patrons the lowest possible margins on goods and services
which they patronize.  Equity provides security to the cooperative in times of financial
stress.  Many agricultural cooperatives experienced substantial financial stress during the
1980s and have sought to determine an optimal level of equity/debt financing.  Sometimes,
cooperative management views the cost of equity as relatively free, allowing for a strong
balance sheet, and the patron views the cost of equity as the opportunity cost of investing in11
the patrons own operation.  Determination of an optimal equity/debt ratio is required to
meet the requirements of both cooperative management and members.
Macroeconomic policy affects the optimal solvency level of an agricultural
cooperative.  Variance in the interest rate and the level of interest rate affects capital
structure and must be accounted for.  An increase in the interest rate from 9.4% to 10.3%
caused the optimal solvency ratio to double while a similar percentage change in the
variance of interest rates was much less dramatic effect.
As agricultural cooperatives prepare to move into the twenty-first century, they
must better project their financial structure if to compete in the market place.  Determining
the optimal capital structure of a cooperative is the first step in building a financially sound
cooperative.
Table 1.  Summary statistics by year (averages by year for 1984-1992)
Number of Return on Standard E/A Interest
Year observations local assets deviation ratio
a rate
1984 14 0.099 0.076 0.609 0.114
1985 14 0.098 0.106 0.662 0.105
1986 14 0.115 0.060 0.673 0.093
1987 14 0.157 0.058 0.709 0.086
1988 14 0.142 0.052 0.687 0.091
1989 14 0.123 0.071 0.708 0.107
1990 14 0.094 0.052 0.703 0.100
1991 14 0.082 0.055 0.690 0.086
1992 14 0.080 0.032 0.715 0.063
a The E/A ratio represents the equity to asset ratio.
Table 2.  Summary statistics by cooperative (averages of 1984-1992 period)
Return on Standard E/A
local assets deviation ratio
a
Coop A 0.095 0.074 0.612
Coop B 0.095 0.050 0.739
Coop C 0.093 0.071 0.535
Coop D 0.095 0.042 0.69612
Coop E 0.147 0.039 0.752
Coop F 0.106 0.031 0.535
Coop G 0.097 0.074 0.802
Coop H 0.122 0.039 0.791
Coop I 0.110 0.049 0.450
Coop J 0.112 0.052 0.533
Coop K 0.130 0.053 0.868
Coop L 0.109 0.184 0.642
Coop M 0.119 0.035 0.900
Coop N 0.110 0.042 0.726
a The E/A ratio represents the equity to asset ratio.




d Interest Var ROLA Var
RAC
b ROE
c E/A +10% +10% +10% +10%
Actual 9 year average 0.684
5.0 0.161 0.243 0.533 0.148 0.248 0.263
10.0 0.129 0.461 0.951 0.287 0.468 0.499
15.0 0.119 0.657 1.000 0.417 0.663 0.712
20.0 0.113 0.835 1.000 0.540 0.839 0.904
25.0 0.110 0.997 1.000 0.654 0.997 1.000
a The E/A ratio represents the equity to asset ratio.
b RAC is defined to be the relative risk aversion coefficient.
c ROE is defined to be the rate of return on equity.
d ROLA is defined to be the rate of return on local assets.




d Interest Var ROLA Var
RAC
b ROE
c E/A +10% +10% +10% +10%
Actual 9 year average 0.684
5.0 0.170 0.213 0.527 0.127 N/A 0.234
10.0 0.132 0.426 1.000 0.254 N/A 0.468
15.0 0.119 0.638 1.000 0.381 N/A 0.702
20.0 0.113 0.851 1.000 0.508 N/A 0.936
25.0 0.109 1.000 1.000 0.635 N/A 1.000
a The E/A ratio represents the equity to asset ratio.
b RAC is defined to be the relative risk aversion coefficient.
c ROE is defined to be the rate of return on equity.
d ROLA is defined to be the rate of return on local assets.
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